Stock Valuation Calculator: Ratios & Intrinsic Value
A stock is neither "expensive" nor "cheap" at its price alone: it all depends on what the company earns, pays out and is worth behind that price. This calculator turns a listed company's key figures — the ones found on its fact sheet or annual report — into a battery of valuation ratios, three intrinsic-value estimates and a signal scorecard, enough to ground a decision in numbers rather than a hunch.
No data is fetched online: the figures are entered by hand, which keeps every assumption visible and adjustable. Per-share figures (EPS, dividend, book value per share…) are preferred, since fact sheets usually publish them that way.
The figures below are a made-up example (a company at 100 € per share, EPS 6 €, dividend 2.50 €…). Replace them with the figures of any stock under consideration.
The stock's figures
Summary
- Estimated intrinsic value (average) 91.05 €
- Margin of safety vs price -9.8 %
- Market capitalisation 50.0 bn €
- P/E ratio 16.7
- Dividend yield 2.50 %
- Favourable signals 4 / 10
At the current price of 100.00 €, the stock trades above its estimated intrinsic value (91.05 €): a premium of 9.8 %, which requires higher growth than you assumed to be justified. The scorecard below breaks down each signal. This is not investment advice.
Intrinsic-value estimates
Three methods, three angles. They almost always disagree: that is normal, and instructive. Keep the range rather than a single figure.
| Method | Estimated value | Gap vs price | What it favours |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gordon growth (dividend) | 39.42 € | -60.6 % | Dividends. Underrates companies that pay out little. |
| DCF (free cash flow) | 86.73 € | -13.3 % | Free cash flow. The heart of a company's value. |
| Graham formula | 147.00 € | +47.0 % | Earnings and growth. A quick gauge, not to be followed literally. |
| Justified P/E (EPS × reference P/E) | 108.00 € | +8.0 % | A "normal" P/E applied to earnings. Complementary, outside the average. |
| Average of the three models | 91.05 € | -9.8 % of margin | Central estimate and margin of safety. |
Gordon: V = D×(1+g) / (r − g) · Graham: V = EPS × (8.5 + 2g) · Margin of safety = (V − price) / V
Valuation multiples
| P/E ratio (price / EPS) | 16.7 |
| PEG (P/E / growth) | 2.08 |
| Price / book (P/B) | 2.86 |
| Price / sales (P/S) | 2.22 |
| EV / EBITDA | 9.2 |
| Dividend yield | 2.50 % |
| Payout ratio | 41.7 % |
| FCF yield | 5.50 % |
| Return on equity (ROE) | 17.1 % |
| Net margin | 13.3 % |
| Net debt / EBITDA | 0.83 |
| Market capitalisation | 50.00 bn € |
Signal scorecard
Each criterion is checked against a usual reading threshold. None decides on its own: it is the convergence that counts. Of 10 signals assessed, 4 come out favourable and 2 call for caution.
| Criterion | Value | Reading | Benchmark |
|---|---|---|---|
| P/E ratio | 16.7 | Neutral | Cheap: < 12 · fair: 12–22 · expensive: > 22 (depends on sector and growth). |
| PEG | 2.08 | Caution | P/E relative to growth: < 1 attractive, > 2 expensive. |
| EV/EBITDA | 9.2 | Neutral | Valuation independent of the capital structure: < 8 reasonable. |
| Dividend yield | 2.5 % | Neutral | Judge it alongside the payout ratio: a fragile high yield is no gift. |
| Payout ratio | 41.7 % | Favourable | Share of earnings paid out: < 60 % comfortable, > 80–100 % stretched. |
| FCF yield | 5.5 % | Neutral | Free cash flow relative to price: > 6 % attractive. The true "cash yield". |
| ROE | 17.1 % | Favourable | Return on equity: > 15 % signals quality (mind the leverage effect). |
| Net margin | 13.3 % | Favourable | Highly sector-specific: compare with peers in the same industry. |
| Net debt / EBITDA | 0.83 | Favourable | Leverage: < 1 low, 1–3 moderate, > 3 high (fragile in a downturn). |
| Margin of safety | -9.8 % | Caution | Discount to estimated intrinsic value: > 20 % gives a cushion for error. |
"Favourable / Neutral / Caution" are mechanical markers based on generic thresholds. A particular sector, business model or cycle can reverse their interpretation.
Multiples only mean something next to something else
A P/E of 30 does not say "expensive". It says thirty times earnings. For a mature bank that is often rich. For a software firm growing at 25% a year it can be the going rate. A multiple earns its keep only when it is set beside the stock's own history, its peers, its sector, and the cycle. On its own it is a floating number.
The PEG tries to correct that: P/E divided by expected growth. Below 1, the rule of thumb reads as paying "cheaply" for growth. It does not certify the growth itself — if the 25% lasts only two years, a pretty PEG is just a P/E in disguise.
EV/EBITDA does a different job. It puts the firm and its debt in one bag and ignores tax, which helps when balance sheets do not look alike. Price-to-sales is most useful when earnings are missing or a mess — a grower that has not yet turned a profit. A low price-to-book can be a bargain, or a business that is burning equity; the ratio alone will not settle which.
Dividend, payout, and cash that actually showed up
An 8% yield looks friendly. Sitting on a 110% payout — more paid out than earned — it is a promise that may last one set of accounts, not a cycle. A dividend is not free income. It is earnings (or cash) leaving the company.
FCF yield is ruder and more honest. It relates the price to free cash actually generated — the cash that funds the dividend, pays down debt, buys back shares. A firm that cuts the coupon but prints FCF is not necessarily "stingy": it may be reinvesting. The opposite exists too: a fat dividend financed with borrowings.
Quality: ROE and leverage
ROE is what the company earns on shareholders' money. Above 15% people start talking about a moat. Unless the 15% is just leverage: thin equity, thick debt, the ratio flies without the business getting better. That is why net debt / EBITDA sits next to it. Above 3, a rate rise or a dull year hurts. Below 1, the structure is usually calmer — not always smarter, if cash is just piling up unused.
Net margin fills in the picture: how many cents survive from each euro of sales. A high ROE with a melting margin is not the same story as a high ROE that has sat still for a decade.
Intrinsic value: a euro in ten years is not a euro today
The price is a mood. Intrinsic value tries to say what the firm is worth, by discounting what it will throw off. The Gordon growth model does it on the dividend; a simplified DCF does it on FCF. Same skeleton:
Value = Next year's flow / (required rate − terminal growth)
Hence r > g. If perpetual growth outruns the required return, the formula blows up — and this calculator refuses the sum, correctly. Nobody outgrows the economy forever. Keep g modest (often under 3–4%, and below long-run nominal GDP) or you will buy a science-fiction value.
The required rate r is not "the central-bank rate". It is the return demanded to hold this specific equity risk — often 8–12% for an ordinary listed name. Raise r and the value shrinks. Tenths of a point move the estimate by tens of percent. That is the model, not a bug.
Graham, and the margin of safety
The Graham formula is a post-war shortcut: a P/E of 8.5 at zero growth, plus 2 P/E points per point of expected growth. Fine as a first peg. Very sensitive to the growth you type. At 15% g it runs away. Treat it as a landmark, not a valuation shop.
Because all of this sits on assumptions, Graham pushed the margin of safety: only buy at a fat enough discount to estimated value (often 20–30%). The cushion so that a wrong g or r does not hurt too much. In his vocabulary, that is also what separates investing from speculating. The calculator shows that margin against the average of the three models — an order of magnitude, not a green light.
Why the three models refuse to agree
That is the point. Gordon undervalues firms that reinvest instead of paying out (thin or zero dividend): no coupon, no value in that formula. DCF catches the reinvestment better, but it hangs on one year's FCF — a heavy capex year and the value collapses for the wrong reason. Graham takes off as soon as g is generous.
Use them as a cluster. If all three sit well above the price, the signal is sturdier than a lone P/E. If they disagree by 80%, the message is not "average them and buy". It is "check the assumptions, and the business".
What the price — and the model — cannot see
Buybacks shrink the share count: EPS rises without the trade changing. Dilution (options, a placing) does the reverse. Neither Gordon nor a P/E flags that on its own. A one-off gain (an asset sale, a won lawsuit) juices a single year's multiple. FCF in a destocking year is not cruise-speed FCF.
Governance, a regulator, a patent cliff, a customer at 40% of sales: off-stage. A ratio is not a substitute for the annual report. The "favourable / neutral / caution" grid on this page is mechanical, on generic cut-offs. A sector or a cycle can flip them without warning.
Limits and caveats
This is an educational tool, not investment advice. Results depend entirely on the figures and assumptions entered. Intrinsic value is highly sensitive to r and g — a few tenths move the estimate by tens of percent.
- Check the data: recurring earnings or a one-off? Representative FCF, or a freak year?
- Look at the trend over several years, not a snapshot.
- A ratio only means something against the sector and the cycle.
- Valuation is silent on governance, competition, regulation.
- Diversify: no spreadsheet removes the risk of losing money.
To place the past return of a stock you already hold, see the investment return calculator; to project a regular plan, the compound interest calculator.